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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(d) (1988) as 
this is an appeal from a final judgment of conviction of a 
criminal charge in the Fifth Circuit Court, County of 
Washington, State of Utah. On October 3, 1989, appellant 
Brent Alan Turner was convicted of violating the St. George 
City Obscenity Ordinance No. 2-77-2 (See Addendum). Prior to 
the trial on March 28, 1989, the Honorable Judge David Mower 
denied appellant Brent Alan Turner's motion to dismiss the 
charges against him and during the course of the trial Judge 
Mower also denied appellant's motion for a directed verdict. 
This appeal challenges the propriety of Judge Mower's decision 
on both appellant's motion to dismiss and appellant's motion 
for a directed verdict. Additionally, this appeal seeks an 
appellate court determination of whether the appellant 
displayed material depicting hard core sexual conduct in a 
patently offensive manner. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Does the St. George Obscenity Statute under 
which appellant was convicted violate the First Amendment to 
the United States Constitution or Article I, Section 15 of the 
Constitution of the State of Utah because that ordinance is 
overly broad and/or unconstitutionally vague? 
2. Has the St. George Obscenity Statute been 
unconstitutionally applied in this case? Put another way, 
under Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 143, 41 L.Ed.2d 642 (1974) 
can the material displayed in Mr. Turner's business be 
considered obscene consistent with the protection afforded 
speech by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution 
and Article I, Section 15 of the Constitution of the State of 
Utah? 
3. Did the State meet its burden of proof to 
establish the necessary elements of Mr. Turner's alleged 
crime. More specifically, did the State establish that the 
material in question: 
a. Appealed to a prurient interest in sex; 
b. Portrayed sexual conduct in a patently offensive 
manner; 
c. Had no serious literary, artistic, political, or 
scientific value when taken as a whole. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND ORDINANCES 
The following constitutional provisions and 
ordinances are considered by appellant to require 
interpretation by this court in order for the court to render a 
decision on the issues presented for appeal: 
A. The St. George City Obscenity Statute, Ordinance 
No. 2-77-2 is too lengthy to reproduce in its entirety here. 
Consequently, the Ordinance is reproduced in its entirety and 
attached hereto in the Addendum. 
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B. The First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution: 
Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting 
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the 
right of the people peaceably to assemble, 
and to petition the government for redress 
of grievances. 
C. Article I, Section 15 of the Constitution of the 
State of Utah: 
No law shall be passed to abridge or 
restrain the freedom of speech or of the 
press. • • • 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
By Information dated November 15, 1988, (Record 
page 1) appellant Brent Alan Turner was charged with 
violation of the St. George City Obscenity Ordinance No. 2-77-2 
§§ 2a(l) and (2). On March 28, 1989, the Honorable Judge David 
Mower denied Mr. Turner's motion to dismiss. (Record page 
106.) In that motion, Mr. Turner argued that the St. George 
City Obscenity Statute was both unconstitutional on its face 
and unconstitutionally applied in Mr. Turner's case. (Record 
page 31 - 43, 84 - 90.) On October 23, after denying Mr. 
Turner's motion for a directed verdict (Trial Transcript pp. 
196 - 207, at Addendum) the case was submitted to a jury which 
convicted him of the crimes charged in the Information. 
(Record page 190.) 
At trial the State alleged that two bed sheets which 
hung on the wall of Mr. Turner's business in Washington County, 
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Utah and which had been hand painted with spray paint depicted 
obscene material in violation of the St. George City Obscenity 
Ordinance. (See trial exhibits 1 - 5 which are photographic 
depictions of the bed sheets as they appeared in Mr. Turner's 
business. The actual photographs do not have a record page 
designation.) To meet their burden of proof, at trial the 
State put on two witnesses, both St. George City police 
officers, who just happened to visit Mr. Turner's business and 
while there photographed the pertinent bed sheets. (See Trial 
Transcript pages 117 - 196.) 
Rather than set forth a description of the two 
"offending" bed sheets herein, appellant invites the court to 
review the relevant photographs which were admitted at trial as 
exhibits 1 - 5 . A request has been made to the Fifth Circuit 
Court to transmit such photographs to the Utah Court of Appeals 
as quickly as possible. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
First, appellant Turner contends that the St. George 
City Obscenity Statute contains within its definition of 
obscenity matters which are considered protected speech and may 
not be proscribed consistent with the First Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and Article I, Section 15 of the 
Utah Constitution. Specifically, only patently offensive 
depictions of "hard core" sexual conduct may be considered 
obscene and if an anti-obscenity law includes non-hard core 
material within its definition of obscenity, as written or 
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construed, then that statute is unconstitutional. The St. 
George Obscenity Statute goes far beyond permissible 
constitutional boundaries. For example, the ordinance makes 
any "spread eagle exposure of female genital organs" obscene. 
Such blanket prohibition of the display of female genitalia 
is too broad to be constitutionally permissible. 
Second, even if the St. George City Obscenity Statute 
is constitutional on its face, it has been unconstitutionally 
applied in this case. Only graphic depictions of hard core 
sexual conduct may be constitutionally prohibited and then only 
when the "dominant theme" of the work is to display such 
hard-core sexual conduct. The rough hand spray painted 
drawings that appear on Mr. Turner's bed sheets are startlingly 
tame when compared to other material which the United States 
Supreme Court has found to be insufficiently "hard-core" to be 
the subject of legitimate, constitutionally appropriate, 
prosecution. Furthermore, the "dominant theme" of Mr. Turner's 
bed sheets is political, espousing such messages as "Fuck 
authority", "Why not let someone else think for you?" and 
"You're afraid, face it." Under the mandate of Jenkins v. 
Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 41 L.Ed.2d 642 (1974) this court, as 
well as the court below, is obligated to make a threshold 
determination as to whether the material in question is 
sufficiently "hard-core" to be presented to a jury for 
determination of obscenity. In light of the past decisions of 
the United States Supreme Court, which helped define what is 
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hard-core and what is not, Mr. Turner's bed sheets are not 
"hard core." Thus his conviction should be overturned. 
Third, in this case, as in all criminal cases, the 
State has the burden to prove each element of the crime. The 
State utterly failed to do so in this case. In fact, one of 
the State's witnesses conceded that Mr. Turner's bed sheets 
contained political and social messages and testified that it 
did not appeal to his prurient interest in sex. The State's 
failure to meet its burden is fatal to its case. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE STATE HAS FAILED TO MEET ITS 
BURDEN OF PROOF. 
As an obvious starting point, the State bears the 
burden in this case, as in all criminal cases, to prove each 
and every element of the crime alleged. State v. Starks, 
627 P.2d 88, 92 (Utah 1981). Next, and equally obvious, if the 
State fails to meet its burden the defendant is entitled to an 
acquittal. State v. Housekeeper, 588 P.2d 139, 140 (Utah 
1978). The fact that this is an obscenity case does not alter 
the State's burden. United States v. Merrill, 746 F.2d 458 
(9th Cir. 1984) cert, den. 105 S.Ct. 926, 83 L.Ed.2d 
938. 
Regardless of whether the defendant resides in St. 
George, Utah, New York City, New York, or anywhere else within 
the United States, and regardless of what is recited in the St. 
George City Obscenity Statute, the prosecutor's burden in every 
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obscenity case, nationwide, is the same and is set forth in 
Miller v, California, 413 U.S. 15, 24, 37 L.Ed.2d 419 
(1973). The prosecution must prove three elements: 
1. That the work, taken as a whole, appeals to 
prurient interest; 
2. That the work is "hard-core" pornography which 
depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, 
sexual conduct; 
3. That the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious 
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. 
Id. at 24. Unless the prosecution in this case has proved 
each element, defendant's conviction should be reversed. 
Appellant must concede that under the many cases in 
which the State's burden of proof in an obscenity trial has 
been considered the State's burden with regard to the first two 
prongs of the Miller three prong test is very light. Indeed, 
while it is clear that the State bears the burden of proving 
each of the three Miller prongs, with regard to the first two 
prongs apparently the State is required to neither produce 
expert testimony, nor any other form of evidence to meet its 
burden. Apparently, with regard to the third prong of the 
Miller test, the State bears some burden of proof over and 
above its burden with regard to the first two prongs. See 
United States v. Merrill, supra, 746 F.2d at 464. 
Perhaps all that can be safely said regarding exactly what the 
State must do to establish that a particular work lacks serious 
literary, artistic, or political value is that the State must 
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introduce some evidence in that regard. In this case the State 
did nothing. 
The State called two witnesses. The first, was 
Kevin Sullivan, a St. George City policeman. Officer 
Sullivan's testimony is set forth in pages 117 - 162 of the 
Trial Transcript. At no point does Officer Sullivan express an 
opinion, comment, or in any way address the concept that the 
bed sheets hanging in Mr. Turner's business lack serious 
literary, artistic or political value. In fact, the only time 
Officer Sullivan expresses any opinion regarding the political 
nature of the ideas expressed on the bed sheets he concedes 
that the term "fuck authority" can be a political statement. 
(Trial Transcript p. 143, at Addendum.) 
The State's second witness, Jim Hatzidakis, another 
St. George City police officer, on cross-examination commented 
in more detail regarding the content of the graffiti on the 
bed sheets. For instance, the following exchange took place: 
Q. And you don't deny that on that wall 
in all that 'graffiti' as you said, 
are political statements? 
A. I would say some of them were probably. 
(Trial Transcript p. 191, at Addendum.) 
Officer Hatzidakis conceded that there was an anti-drug 
message within the graffiti, (Trial Transcript 190 - 191, at 
Addendum); that other matters set forth on the bed sheets had 
no meaning at all to him (Trial Transcript p. 188, at 
Addendum); and that other items were certainly not sexual in 
nature (Trial Transcript pp. 189 - 190, at Addendum). 
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Finally, in what is a rather remarkable exchange considering 
Officer Hatzidakis was called as one of the State's only two 
witnesses, Mr. Hatzidakis concedes that the work taken as 
whole did not appeal to his prurient interest: 
Q. Out of the ordinary, unusual, but was 
it designed, when looking at this 
whole thing as a whole, was it 
designed to appeal to your prurient 
interests in sexual matters. 
A. I would - no. 
Q. No, right? 
A. No. 
(Trial Transcript pp. 193 - 194, at Addendum.) 
Although appellant concedes that exactly what the 
State must introduce by way of evidence to bear its burden of 
proof in obscenity cases is a difficult matter to deduce from a 
review of the case law, it is clear that the State must 
introduce something pertinent to each element and that the 
State is required to do something extra with regard to its 
burden of proving the third prong of the Miller test. See, 
United States v. Merrill, supra; United States v. 
Various Articles of Obscene Merchandise, 709 F.2d 132, 135 
(2nd Cir. 1983). In this case, the State introduced no 
evidence regarding any of the three prongs of the Miller 
test. In fact, one of the State's two witnesses testified 
unequivocally that the work taken as a whole did not appeal to 
his prurient interests and conceded that at least some the 
items displayed were political or literary in nature. Perhaps 
the only workable standard to judge whether the State has met 
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its burden of proof in the prosecution of obscenity cases is to 
concede that each film, each book, each work of art, or each 
bed sheet which is allegedly obscene presents a unique mix of 
ideas and concepts and therefore the proof required to 
establish that such works lack serious political, literary, or 
artistic value will be unique as well. Thus, a case by case 
analysis is required. In any event, however, when the State 
fails to produce expert testimony addressing the political 
content of the obscene work, fails to produce other works for 
comparison, fails to introduce scholarly treatises or other 
authority criticizing or analyzing the work as a whole, and 
even fails to produce lay testimony addressing the critical 
third prong of the Miller test, the State has failed to meet 
its burden. 
POINT II 
THE ST. GEORGE OBSCENITY ORDINANCE IS 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL ON ITS FACE. 
A. Historical perspective in light of Miller v. California. 
The issue of what types of "speech" states, counties 
or municipalities may or may not prohibit has generated 
considerable litigation. The most definitive pronouncement 
from the United States Supreme Court on the subject came in the 
case of Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 37 L.Ed.2d 419 
(1973). In Miller the court reiterated that speech found to 
be obscene is not protected by the First Amendment and can 
subject the "speaker" to criminal prosecution. The question 
was in Miller and is once again in this case, how can 
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legislation define what is "obscene" without infringing upon 
speech which is protected by the First Amendment of the United 
States Constitution? 
In Miller the court set forth a three part test to 
be included in anti-obscenity legislation. Id. at 24. In 
order for anti-obscenity legislation to be constitutional it 
must declare obscene only material which when taken as a whole 
appeals to prurient interest, depicts specifically defined 
sexual conduct in a patently offensive way and lacks serious 
literary, artistic, political or scientific value. Id. The 
allegedly obscene material must meet all three criteria or it 
is protected speech and cannot subject the "speaker" to 
criminal prosecution. See, Miller, supra, Kois v. 
Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 33 L.Ed.2d 312 (1972); Jenkins v. 
Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 41 L.Ed.2d 642 (1974). 
It is also clear that under the holdings of the 
United States Supreme Court only patently offensive depictions 
of "hard core" sexual conduct may be considered obscene. If an 
anti-obscenity law includes non-hard core material within the 
definition of obscenity, as written or construed, then the 
statute is unconstitutional. Chief Justice Berger, writing 
for the court in Miller v. California stated: 
Under the holdings announced today, no one 
will be subject to prosecution for the sale 
or exposure of obscene materials unless 
these materials depict or describe patently 
offensive 'hard core' sexual conduct 
specifically defined by the regulating 
state law as written or construed. 
(Emphasis added.) 
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Miller, 413 U.S. at 27. See also, Home Box Office v. 
Wilkinson/ 531 F.Supp. at 994 wherein the court stated: 
States may not go beyond Miller in 
prescribing criminal penalties for 
distribution of sexually oriented 
materials. For better or worse, Miller 
establishes the analytical boundary of 
permissible state involvement. 
Id. at 994. See also United States v. Various Articles 
of Obscene Merchandise, 562 F.2d 185, cert, den, in 
Long v. United States, 436 U.S. 931, 56 L.Ed.2d 776 (1977) 
(only hard core sexual conduct may be obscene); United States 
v. Obscene Magazines, Books and Advertising Material, 653 F.2d 
381 (9th Cir. 1981) (proscriptions against obscenity must 
be limited to hard core sexual conduct); Graham v. Hill, 
444 F.Supp. 584 (D.Texas 1978) (only hard core sexual conduct 
may be prohibited). 
What is or is not to be considered "hard core sexual 
conduct" has also been the subject of much litigation, but 
several matters are clear. First, nudity alone, however 
clearly displayed or in whatever detail depicted, is not 
obscene, even when viewed by minors. See, Jenkins v. 
Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 161, 41 L.Ed.2d 642 (1974); Schad v. 
Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 - 66, 68 L.Ed.2d 671 (1981); 
Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 213 and 
ftn. 10, 45 L.Ed.2d 125 (1975); Home Box Office, Inc. v. 
Wilkinson, 531 F.Supp. 986, 996 (Dist. Utah 1982). 
Next, as the Supreme Court announced in Roth v. 
United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), "Sex and obscenity are not 
synonyms . . . the portrayal of sex, e.g. in art, literature 
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and scientific works, is not itself sufficient reason to deny 
the material the constitutional protection of freedom of speech 
and press." Id. at 487. In a case called Huffman v. 
United States, 470 F.2d 386 (D.C. Cir. 1971) remanded in 502 
F.2d 419 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (obscenity conviction overturned) 
the court offered an exhaustive history of what has and what 
has not been considered obscene. For example, with regard to 
films or photographic depictions it is clear that "the mere 
exposure of genitalia is not sufficient to justify finding a 
photograph obscene." Id. at 399 citing Sunshine Book 
Company v. Summerfield, 355 U.S. 372 (1958). It is also 
clear that magazines in which there are pictures of young women 
either naked or clad in only garter belts and other attire 
employed to frame the pubic area and to focus attention upon 
it are not obscene. Huffman, 470 F.2d at 399 citing 
Central Magazine Sales v. United States, 389 U.S. 50, 10 
L.Ed.2d 49 (1968). Lastly, and perhaps most importantly for 
this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit after reviewing the pertinent United States Supreme 
Court decisions, announced: 
[W]e are obliged to conclude that no 
photograph of the female anatomy, no matter 
how posed if no sexual activity is being 
engaged in, or however lacking in social 
value, can be held obscene. 
Hunt v. Keriakos, 428 F.2d 606, 608 (1st Cir. 1970), 
cert, den. 400 U.S. 929, 27 L.Ed.2d 189. 
Thus, in summary, the kind of hard core pornography 
that the Court in Miller recognized could be considered 
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obscene does not include simple nudity, and does not include 
the display of human, female genitalia regardless of how 
explicit or how detailed, unless some form of sexual action 
is also portrayed. 
B. The St. George obscenity ordinance is unconstitutionally 
over-broad. 
By its terms the St. George obscenity statute 
encompasses within the definition of obscenity matters which 
are clearly protected by the First Amendment and which clearly 
cannot be considered obscene. For example, under the 
definition of "sexual conduct" the statute includes "any 
explicit close-up representation of a human genital organ or a 
spread eagle exposure of female genital organs." §le(2). Such 
pictorial representations, absent the depiction of some kind of 
sexual activity, cannot be considered obscene and are protected 
by the First Amendment. See, Central Magazine Sales v. 
United States, supra, and Hunt v. Keriakos, supra. 
The statute goes on to include within the definition of "sexual 
conduct" simple nudity. §le(4). Once again, it is clear that 
simple nudity cannot be considered obscene under any 
circumstances. See, Jenkins v. Georgia, supra; Home Box 
Office, Inc. v. Wilkinson, supra. 
Appellant concedes that when possible a court 
considering the constitutionality of an ordinance dealing 
with the First Amendment should construe the law narrowly and 
in a constitutional manner. However, the St. George obscenity 
statute is so riddled with infirmities it is not capable of 
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being constitutionally construed. As Judge Jenkins stated in 
Home Box Office, Inc. v, Wilkinson, supra: 
To construe the otherwise plain terms of 
the statute to a meaning consistent with 
Miller 'simply exchanges over-breadth for 
vagueness.1 (citations omitted.) 
Home Box Office, 531 F.Supp. at 998. The St. George 
obscenity statute is capable of only one construction within 
the plain terms of its language. That construction includes 
within the definition of obscenity matters which are entitled 
to First Amendment protection. Therefore, the statute is 
unconstitutionally over-broad and must be struck down. 
POINT III 
THE ST. GEORGE OBSCENITY STATUTE HAS BEEN 
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY APPLIED IN THIS CASE. 
A. The court must determine if the allegedly obscene material 
is sufficiently "hard core" to be submitted to the jury. 
Although it is true that what appeals to "prurient 
interest" and what is "patently offensive" are issues of fact 
to be left to the trier of fact, juries do not have unbridled 
discretion in that regard. In Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 
153, 41 L.Ed.2d 642 (1974) appellant Jenkins was convicted 
under Georgia's obscenity statute of displaying obscene 
material, the film Carnal Knowledge. The jury after proper 
instruction, found the appellant guilty and also found that the 
movie Carnal Knowledge appealed to both prurient interest and 
displayed sexual conduct in a "patently offensive" manner. On 
appeal, the State of Georgia contended that whether a 
particular depiction or portrayal is primarily designed to 
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appeal to prurient interest and displays sexual conduct in a 
patently offensive way is a matter exclusively for the jury and 
should not be the subject of judicial review. The United 
States Supreme Court disagreed and reversed the conviction. 
Justice Renquist, now Chief Justice, delivered the opinion of 
the Court and stated: 
Even though questions of appeal to the 
'prurient interest' or of patent 
offensiveness are 'essentially questions of 
fact', it would be a serious misreading of 
Miller to conclude that juries have 
unbridled discretion in determining what is 
'patently offensive'. Not only did we 
there say that 'the First Amendment values 
applicable to the states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment are adequately 
protected by the ultimate power of 
appellate courts to conduct an independent 
review of constitutional claims when 
necessary,' (citations omitted) but we made 
it plain that under that holding 'no one 
will be subject to prosecution for the sale 
or exposure of obscene materials unless 
these materials depict or describe patently 
offensive "hard core" sexual conduct.' 
(Citations omitted.) 
Id. at 650. Thus, to protect defendant from prosecution for 
non "hard core" material, the court has the obligation to 
determine as a matter of constitutional law whether the 
particular matters "depict or describe patently offensive 'hard 
core' sexual conduct." Id. at 650 - 651. 
B. The materials depicted within the walls of defendant's 
business are not, as a matter of constitutional law, obscene. 
The matters depicted by the defendant (1) do not 
appeal to "prurient interest", (2) do not portray any hard core 
sexual conduct in a patently offensive way and, (3) when taken 
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as a whole, bear the earmarks of artistic or political speech 
rather than appealing to prurient interest. 
A "prurient interest" in sex has been defined by the 
United States Supreme Court as a "shameful or morbid interest 
in sex." See Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 
U.S. 491, 504 - 505, 86 L.Ed.2d 394, 406 (1985) citing Roth 
v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957). In 
viewing the matters depicted within defendant's business, it is 
hard to imagine how anything there displayed could appeal to 
anyone's interest in sex, morbid, shameful or otherwise. 
Nothing there is sexy. (The State's own witnesses admitted the 
material was not sexy. (Trial Transcript at pp. 193 - 194, 
at Addendum.) To understand just how tame the material 
involved in this case is compared to other material which the 
United States Supreme Court has held not to be obscene the 
case of Central Magazine Sales Limited v. United States, 389 
U.S. 50, 19 L.Ed.2d 49, reversing 373 F.2d 633 (4th Cir. 
1967), is instructive. In that case, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit described the non-obscene 
photographs, which were contained in a magazine called 
"Exclusive", as follows: 
Exclusive is a collection of photographs of 
young women. In most of them long 
stockings and garter belts are employed to 
frame the pubic area and to focus 
attention upon it. A suggestion of 
masochism is sought by the use in many of 
the pictures of chains binding the models' 
wrists and ankles. Some of the seated 
models, squarely facing the camera, have 
their knees and legs wide spread in order 
to reveal the genital area in its 
entirety. In one of the pictures, all of 
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these things are combined: The model, clad 
in only a framing black garter belt and 
black stockings is chained to a chair upon 
which she is seated, facing the camera, 
with one knee elevated and both spread wide. 
Central Magazine Sales, 373 F.2d at 634. 
Given that the pictures described above are 
constitutionally protected and are not obscene, it is absurd to 
suggest that the matters depicted within defendant's business 
are somehow more perverse, appeal more to the prurient 
interest, and are more patently offensive. It is clear from a 
review of the relevant cases that the kinds of sexual conduct 
which are considered obscene are markedly more severe and 
"unusual" than what this defendant has displayed. For 
instance, a profusely illustrated book whose dominate theme was 
sexual relations between human beings and animals was 
considered obscene. United States v. Friedman, 528 F.2d 
784 (10th Cir. 1976). Another example can be found in the 
case of United States v. Various Articles of Obscene 
Merchandise. 460 F.Supp. 826 (Dist. N.Y. 1978) wherein the 
court held that a film which consisted entirely of two naked 
teenage boys engaged in homosexual conduct, with no plot, point 
or message and no acting or directorial skills was obscene. 
Lastly, in a case particularly apposite to this case, because 
it discusses what is and is not a "lewd exhibition of the 
genitals", the court found that pictures in Penthouse 
Magazine which included a naked woman with her finger inserted 
into the lips of her genitals, so that it contacted her 
clitoris, with eyes open and an expression consistent with 
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masturbation on her face did constitute a lewd exhibition of 
the genitals. Penthouse v. McAuliffe, 610 F.2d 1353, 1365 
(5th Cir. 1980). On the other hand, in the same case the 
court determined that pictures of "young women either largely 
or totally undressed, exposing various portions of their 
bodies" did not constitute a lewd exhibition of the genitals. 
Id. Defendant's rough drawings do not reach the level of 
"hard core" material. They neither appeal to a "prurient 
interest" in sex nor portray "sexual conduct" in a patently 
offensive way. The bed sheet graffiti in this case does not 
rise to the level of "hard core" material that may subject the 
owner to prosecution for the display of obscene material. 
Judge Mower should have recognized that nothing on the bed 
sheets was "hard core" and granted Turner's motion to dismiss, 
and this court should now reverse Turner's conviction on that 
basis. 
Furthermore, it is clear that the predominate theme 
of the matters depicted within defendant's business are not 
sexual at all, but rather are primarily political. Defendant 
espouses such notions as anti-drugs, anti-abortion and free 
thinking. He asks "why not let someone else think for you?" 
and "You're afraid face it." He warns: "run and hide. Death 
will find you. White flies will eat your flesh." The dominate 
theme of the work is to shock the viewer and to motivate 
introspection, to warn against drugs and abortion. In Kois 
v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S 229, 33 L.Ed.2d 312 (1972) the United 
States Supreme Court held that in order for any material to be 
19 
obscene its "dominate theme" must appeal to prurient interest 
and cautioned that any reviewing court trying to determine 
whether a particular work is protected or obscene must look at 
the context in which the allegedly obscene matter appears. 
Id. The dominant theme of Turner's bed sheets is admittedly 
difficult to identify precisely, but it is surely not to appeal 
to a prurient interest in sex and most closely resembles 
political or social commentary, including commentary on sexual 
matters. 
The items displayed by defendant may be vulgar, they 
may be unusual or shocking and they may be contrary to the 
prosecutor's or the court's notions of good taste, but they are 
not obscene. In Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 29 
L.Ed.2d 284 (1971) Justice Harlin observed: 
One man's vulgarity is another man's 
lyric. Indeed, we think it is largely 
because governmental officials cannot make 
principled distinctions in this area that 
the constitution leaves matters of taste 
and style so largely to the individual. 
Id. at 25. The material on Turner's sheets is more tame, 
less graphic, less "hard core" and less offensive than the 
material described in any reported obscenity case decided by 
the U.S. Supreme Court or where certiorari has been denied. To 
uphold Turner's conviction is to limit the scope of protection 
afforded by the United States and Utah Constitutions to a 
degree far exceeding what any appellate court has done and far 
exceeding the boundaries fixed by the U.S. Supreme Court. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Judge Mower's 
decision to deny Turner's motion to dismiss and to deny 
Turner's motion for a directed verdict were in error. Those 
decisions should be reversed and therefore Turner's conviction 
should be reversed as well. Furthermore, independently of this 
court's review of the propriety of Judge Mower's decisions 
regarding Turner's motions, this court has the obligation to 
review the allegedly obscene material and ensure that it is "a 
graphic depiction of hard core sexual conduct" that may be 
submitted to a jury for a determination of obscenity. In this 
case, the materials depicted in Turner's business are not a 
patently offensive depiction of hard core sexual conduct and 
therefore Mr. Turner cannot face prosecution for the display of 
such materials because his conduct was and is constitutionally 
protected by the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. On that basis as well his conviction should be 
reversed. Additionally, the St. George Obscenity Statute is 
unconstitutional on its face, should be struck down, and 
Turner's conviction under the statute reversed. Lastly, 
Turner's conviction should be reversed because the State failed 
to produce evidence to meet its burden to establish each of the 
three prongs of the Miller test. 
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ORDINANCE NO. 2-77-2 
AN ORDINANCE RELATING TO OBSCENITY AND 
PROHIBITING CONDUCT RELATING THERETO; 
PROVIDING PROCEDURES FOR INFORCEMENT; 
FIXING A PENALTY; AND ESTABLISHING AN 
EFFECTIVE DATE. 
BE IT ORDAINED BY THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF ST. GEORGE, UTA 
Section 1. DEFINITIONS: When used in this ordinance, the follow-
ing words shall have the following meanings: 
a. "Obscene" is a word descriptive of any material 
or performance which, when taken as a whole and considered in the 
context of the contemporary standards of this community: 
(1) Appeals to prurient interest in sex; 
(2) Portrays sexual conduct in a patently offensi 
manner; 
(3) Has no serious literary, artistic, political 
or scientific value. 
b. "Material" means: 
(1) Any printed or written book, magazine, articl 
pamphlet, writing or printing; 
(2) Any picture, illustration, drawing, photograp 
motion picture or pictorial representation; 
(3) Any statue or other figure; 
(4) Any recording or transcription; 
(5) Any reproduction including but not limited to 
mechanical, chemical, or electrical reproduct 
ions ; 
(6) Any undeveloped photographs, models, printing 
plates, and other latent representational 
objects; 
(7) Anything which is or may be used as a means 
of communication. 
c. "Performance11 means any play, motion picture, or 
any physical human bodily activity, whether engaged in alone or 
with other persons, including but not limited to singing, speakinj 
dancing, acting, simulating, pantomining, or other exhibition 
performed before an audience. 
d. "Contemporary community standards1' means those 
moral standards of decency existing in this community at the time 
the offense is alleged to have occurred. 
e. "Sexual conduct" includes any of the following 
described forms of sexual conduct if depicted or described in a 
patently offensive way: 
(1) An act of sexual intercourse normal or 
perverted, actual or simulated, including 
genital-genital, anal-genital, oral-anal, 
or oral-genital intercourse, whether between 
human beings or between a human being and 
an animal, or between animals. 
(2) Masturbation, excretion, execretory functions 
or lewd exhibition of the genitals, including 
any explicit close-up representation of a 
human genital organ or a spread eagle exposure 
of female genital organs. 
(3) Physical contact or simulated physical contact 
with the clothed or unclothed pubic areas or 
buttocks of a human male or female, whether 
alone or between members of the same or 
opposite sex or between humans and animals 
in an act of apparent sexual stimulation or 
gratification. 
(4) Nudity of human Dubic areas, buttocks, genital 
organs or female breasts below the top of 
the areola. 
f. "Prurient interest" means a shameful, morbid, 
lustful, lascivious or lewd interest in nudity, sex, sexual conduc 
or excretion. 
g. "Knowingly" means to have an awareness, actual 
or constructive, of the character of the material or of a perfor-
mance. A person has constructive knowledge, if a reasonable 
inspection or observation under the circumstances would have dis-
closed the nature of the subject matter. 
h. "Public place" means a place accessible or visible 
to members of the public or to casual passersby whether or not a 
fee or charge is made for entrance. 
i. "Distribute" means to transfer possession of 
materials with or without consideration. 
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j. "Furnish" means to sell, give, present, rent, 1c 
or otherwise provide. 
k. "Display publicly" means the exposing, placing, 
posting, exhibiting, advertising or in any fashion displaying in 
any public place. 
Section 2: PROHIBITED CONDUCT: 
a. No person shall knowlingly: 
(1) Distribute, display publicly, furnish or 
provide to any person any obscene material 
or performance; or 
(2) Prepare, publish, print, create, advertise 
or possess any obscene material or performanc 
or 
(3) Distribute, exhibit, or offer to distribute, 
or exhibit, any obscene material. 
b. Each separate offense under this section is a 
class B misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not more then $299.00 
and by incarceration for a term of not more than six months. 
c. Each separate offense under this section, in addi 
ion to all other penalties, shall result in an immediate and auto 
matic revocation of the business license of the person convicted 
hereunder, without further action by the City Council. 
Section 3: INDUCING ACCEPTANCE OF OBSCENE MATERIAL: 
a. No person shall knowingly induce acceDtance of 
obscene material or performance: 
(1) As a condition to a sale, allocation, consign-
ment, or delivery for resale of any newspaper, 
magazine, periodical, book, publication, motio 
picture film, or other merchandise. 
(2) By denying, revoking, or threatening to deny 
or revoke a franchise, or by imposing any 
penalty, financial or otherwise, because of 
the failure or refusal to accept obscene 
material or material reasonably believed by 
the purchaser or consignee to be obscene. 
b. Each separate offense under this section is a 
class B misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not more than $299.00 
and by incarceration for a term of not more than six months. 
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c. Each separate offense under this section, in 
addition to all other penalties, shall result in an immediate 
and automatic revocation of the business license of the person 
convicted hereunder without further action by the city. 
Section 4: EXPERT TESTIMONY NOT REQUIRED. 
a. Neither the prosecutor nor the defense shall be 
required to, but may, introduce expert testimony concerning the 
obscene character of the material or performance which is the 
subject of the prosecution under this ordinance. 
Section 5: SEIZURE AND DISPOSITION OF PROHIBITED MATERIALS, 
INJUNCTIONS AND JURISDICTION: 
a. Any person who is authorized to arrest any person 
ror a violation of this J^a« is also authorized to seize any of 
the prohibited articles found in possession or under the control 
of the person arrested and to deliver them to the magistrate be-
fore whom the person arrested is required to be taken. 
b. The city magistrate to whom any of the prohibited 
articles are delivered pursuant to subsection (a) must, upon the 
examination of the accused, or if the examination is delayed or 
prevented, without awaiting the examination, determine the chara-
cter of the article, and if he finds it to be obscene he must 
deliver one copy to the prosecuting attorney for the city and 
must at once impound all the other copies until the defendant is 
acquitted, the prosecution abandoned, or the time for appeal has 
elapsed, or in the case of an appeal, until the matter is finally 
adjudicated by the appropriate appellate court, and then he shall 
cause them to be destroyed or returned to the accused, as the 
case may be. 
c. Upon the final conviction of the accused, the 
prosecuting attorney must cause any writing, paper, book, picture, 
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print, design, figure, still or motion picture, photograph or 
negative thereof, photocopy, engraving, sound recording, card, 
instrument, or other thing which is obscene in respect whereof 
the accused stands convicted and which remains in the possession 
or under control of the prosecuting attorney to be destroyed. 
d. The city court of this city has jurisdiction to 
enjoin the sale, distribution or exhibition of obscene material 
or performances, as follows: 
(1) Any person who sells or offers for sale, 
distributes, exhibits or is about to sell, 
distribute, or exhibit, or has in his posses-
sion with intent to sell, distribute or 
exhibit, or is about to acquire possession 
with intent to sell, distribute, or exhibit 
any material which is obscene may be enjoined 
in an action in the city or circuit court 
by the city prosecutor to prevent the sale, 
distribution, exhibition, acquisition, or 
possession of the obscene material. 
(2) Every person who sells, distributes, exhibits, 
displays publicly, or acquires possession 
with intent to sell, distribute, display 
publicly or exhibit any of the matters re-
ferred to in this section, after service upon 
him of a summons and complaint in any action 
brought by the prosecuting attorney pursuant 
to this section, is presumed to have knowledge 
of the contents of the material listed in the 
complaint from the date of service. 
(3) The person sought to be enjoined shall be 
entitled to a trial of the issues within a 
reasonable time after joinder of issue and 
said trial shall be granted a priority trial 
setting by the court. In the event a final 
judgment of injunction is entered for the 
city, the final judgment shall contain an 
order directing the defendant to surrender 
to the Chief of Police of this city all of 
the material described in the complaint and 
found to be obscene, and the Chief of Police 
shall be directed to destroy it. 
Section 6: DEFENSES: The following defenses may be raised in any 
prosecution under this ordinance. 
a. That the distribution of obscene material was 
restricted to institutions or persons having bona fide scientific; 
educational, governmental, or other similar justification for 
possessing such material; however, bona fide justification does 
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THE WITNESS: So which question am I answering? 
MR. BOYACK: I'm asking you — 
THE COURT: The last one that he asked you. 
THE WITNESS: Would you repeat it, please. 
Q. (By Mr. Boyack) Since I can't, I'm going to ask 
you another one. I just asked can it be taken in the context J 
if I say "fuck authority," that that's a political statement? 
A. Yes. 
QL It could be political, it could be obscene? 
A. Yes. 
QL In your opinion? 
A. Yes. 
QL N O W , I'm going to show you what has been marked 
as Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 6, that I assume you testified 
to as the ceiling. Do you find that objectionable or illegal J 
either one? If so, state whether it's objectionable or 
illegal or maybe both. 
A. As far as its legality, again, I wasn't sure if 
it was illegal or not. 
Q. Are you sure now? 
A. No. Again, I believe that's for the jury to 
decide. 
Q. So your testimony to this jury, you don't know 
whether or not Mr. Turner should be found guilty, because 
you don't know whether that's legal or illegal, is that what 
ft Okay, And if you read it, it said, too, in part, 
that the item to be obscene, had to be taken as a whole, 
is that true? Do you remember that in the language? 
A. Yeah, I do. 
ft Okay. Now, if I could have those pictures back 
wherever they ended up. 
These particular pictures depict a — all around the 
different areas of the storage unit, is that true? 
A. All the banners and the posters that were up there 
were — that were hand done were on the north wall and the 
northeajst wall. 
ft Okay. Let me show you what has been marked as 
Plaintiff's No. 4 and ask you if looking at the picture 
"Run and hide. Death will find you." Do you think that's 
a political statement? 
A. I have no idea. 
ft You donft know what it means, do you? 
A. No, sir, I do not. 
ft It's an expression of the author of whoever wrote 
it, is that correct? 
A. I have no idea, sir. 
ft So it could be literary, it could be political, 
but you don't know? 
A. I don't know. 
ft But it's not sexual, is it? 
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A. That item is not. 
Q. Now, looking at the same photograph, it says, 
"Sold your soul." What do you think that means? 
A. Do you want my opinion? 
Q. Yeah, Ifm asking you if you know what it means. 
A. Sold your soul, I would think — anybody who 
has heard of any kind of devil worshipping or anything 
like that, you sold your soul to the devil. 
Q. Well, you think that's a devil worship slogan? 
A- Well, to me it would be. You asked my opinion and 
that would be my opinion that it would be selling your 
soul to the devil. 
Qt Okay. You don't mean it sells — it couldn't 
mean, in your opinion, then, sold your soul to society or 
to an establishment, something like that — 
A. I've never heard it used that way, but it could 
be. 
Q. Sure could be, couldn't it? 
A. Sure. 
Qt The fact is that you guessed when you thought that 
might be some devil worship, didn't you? 
A. Well, from my upbringing, it would be — my 
interpretation is selling your soul to the devil. 
Q. Okay. But in any case, it's not sexual in 
nature, is it? 
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A. No, sir. 
Q. "White flies will eat your flesh." What does 
that mean? 
A. I have no idea. 
Q. Sexual in nature? 
A. I hope not. 
Q. In other words, there was just all kinds of 
outrageous, childish, kiddish statements on that wall, 
correct? And some of them may have had some sexual connota-
tions, isn't that true? 
A. That's true. 
Q. But taken as a whole as you understand the statute 
in St. George, there was some political statements, wasn't 
there? 
A, There may be here. I don't know. 
Q. And depending on how you interpret it, there was 
some literary statements also? It may not have been good, 
but it certainly appeared to be literary, right? 
A. Okay. 
Qt Now, looking at Defendant's No. 1, calling your 
attention up to the left-hand corner where it says "drugs," 
then it's got a line through it like it's a sign, how do 
you interpret that? 
A. To be like a road sign saying "saying no to drugs." 
Q. I'm asking you if that's what it looks like to you. 
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A. That's what it appears to me. 
Q. And would that be interpretative of saying no to 
drugs or no drugs or no drugs here or something like that? 
A. That's what it appeared to me. 
Q. Is that a political statement? 
A. It's a statement. 
Q. Drugs right now is the biggest political issue, 
it's going on right now contemporarily, isn't it? 
A. Yeah. 
Qt And when you put "no to drugs/' that's a political 
statement, is it not? 
A. Okay, yeah. 
ft And you don't deny that on that wall in all that 
quote "graffiti" as you said it are political statements? 
A. I would say some of them were probably. 
Qt Now, let's get down to business here a little bit 
and look at some of the more interesting stuff. Looking 
at the term "group sex," that's something that sounds 
a little more interesting, isn't it? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. What do you think that means? 
A. Exactly what it would imply to me. A group of 
people having sex. 
Q. Would that mean having multiple sexual partners? 
A. Pardon me? 
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A. A record. 
ft What does it say down at the bottom? 
A. Group sex. 
Q. In other words, the group sex that you thought 
stood for multiple partners could well have been the name 
of a rock group, isnft that true? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Qt Now, we've talked about taking this whole thing as 
a whole. I'd like to talk about it appealing to prurient 
interest. Do you remember that when you read that statute? 
Do you remember that? 
A. Yes. 
Qt Now, we're pretty good friends, aren't we? 
A. Yes. 
Qt Did that — did the worst drawing, that is, the 
most dirty, vulgar, and I'm using maybe my own language, 
but for purposes of emphasis, did the worst picture there 
appeal to your prurient interest in sex? 
A. I would say that there was one there that did. 
I would have to say there was one. 
Qt And it sexually excited you — 
A. I don't know if it excited me, but it was — 
definitely to me it was out of the ordinary as far as being -
Qt Out of the ordinary, unusual, but was it designed, 
when looking at this whole thing as a whole, was it designed 
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to appeal to your prurient interests in sexual matters? 
A, I would — no. 
& No, right? 
A. No. 
MR. BOYACK: No further questions, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Shumway? 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION, 
BY MR. SHUMWAY: 
Qt Which one were you referring to there? 
A, There's, on this northeast wall, a picture of 
a woman with her legs spread. 
THE COURT: Which exhibit number are you referring 
to, Mr. Hatzidakis? 
THE WITNESS: Exhibit No. 2, sir. 
Qt (By Mr. Shumway) And why did you pick that lady 
out? 
A. She's laid back with her legs spread and it shows 
like pubic hair and above her it says, "Tuna factory." 
Qt Now, a lot of things on there are different, 
aren't they? Why is this one picked out by you? 
A. Well, it just — it appears to be sexual in nature 
on that one. 
Q. Do you know what it means to appeal to prurient 
interest? 
A. It means to get me excited. It didn't get me 
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your 
Mr. 
MR. 
THE 
BOYACK: 
COURT: 
Shumway, what 
MR. 
Honor. 
MR. 
SHUMWAY: 
BOYACK: 
Nothing further, 
Thanks, 
else? 
The Ci 
I have 
. I'm 
Mr. Hatzidakis 
.ty would 
a motion 
rest < 
at th 
through 
. 
at 
is 
this 
time, 
. 
point, 
your 
Honor. 
MR. SHUMWAY: May he be excused or do you want 
him to stick around too. 
MR. BOYACK: No, he can be excused. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Hatzidakis. You're 
excused. 
(Witness excused.) 
THE COURT: We'll need to have the jury go 
out then. 
Ladies and gentlemen, there's something I need to 
handle in the case that unfortunately you cannot listen to. 
I need to have you go out. And the bailiff will assist 
you and find a place where you can be, and then he'll have 
you come back in when we're ready. Please don't talk about 
this case with anybody or form or express an opinion on it 
till it's finally submitted to you. Thank you. 
Okay. The jury's outside the courtroom. Mr. Boyack? 
MR, BOYACK: Yes. I have a motion to dismiss 
on the basis that the City has totally failed to meet its 
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had political, had literary functions which would be the 
kiss of death to a prosecution successfully under the 
statute. 
And then it goes on, it portrays sexual conduct in a 
patently-offensive manner. Again, it's sort of a continuous 
argument, but saying from their own witnesses that it 
was subject to one picture, we all figured, I guess, eventually 
would get down to. And that in and of itself, if taken 
by itself, I suppose, you could sustain our argument, that 
it was patently sexually offensive by itself, but in order 
to be guilty under the statute, it has to be taken in the 
meaning and the framework of the entire — the entire 
picture. 
Item No. 3, I'm just going down through the ordinance, 
has no literary, artistic, political — I've circled 
political — or scientific value. I can't one iota of 
scientific value, but I certainly think an argument can 
be made both for literary and artistic and certainly each 
witness has admitted it has political value. 
Then it goes on defining certain things that are not 
really applicable here. 
In order to have been found guilty, Mr. Turner, Mr. 
Shumway would have had to have met a burden that each one 
of the bases had to be touched in rounding third base for 
home. 
B Y R O N R A Y Cnm«TiAw«*tj i-
THE COURT: Let me stop you just a minute. The 
clerk gave me a note wondering if a lady in the observation 
room is a defense witness. Apparently she didn't know her 
and I don't know who it is either, but are one of your 
witnesses there, Mr. — 
MR. BOYACK: She is, your Honor. I didn't see 
her there. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thanks for bringing that up. 
Okay, you were talking about having to touch each one of 
the bases — 
MR. BOYACK: Yeah. Where I was at was I'm saying 
that if you get up to bat here, you at least have got to 
have a chance of being able to touch all three of the 
bases and then come home. 
They missed first base, which is it's a political and 
it has political ramifications all through it and that's 
been their own testimony in their case in chief. 
It — I guess it's a matter of what is serious literary 
value, but I think we've established that it had literary 
value of some type, in that the author had statements 
to make. 
And three, we have to take this whole thing as a whole, 
and if you do that, the other two things come in, that is, 
the literary and the political aspects of it. And then 
you can get down and discuss whether there's a prurient 
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interest or there isn't. And the officerfs own testimony 
was it didn't appeal to his prurient interest and I don't 
think they've sustained a burden. I think they have an 
obligation to touch all of those bases before they can 
take that to the jury. And their case, after they've 
rested, clearly shows an acquittal with no room for any 
interpretation of any reasonable doubt. Their own witnesses 
agree that they haven't met their burden. I'm not saying 
they agree with that in saying — by saying "we agree we 
haven't met your burden," but they certainly said there is 
literary, political and — I don't think artistic ever 
played into it — and I think this case should be killed 
at this point. On any basis of any case, failing to establish 
by any reasonable means whatsoever, how a reasonable jury 
could find, given their case in chief, that there is a 
violation of their own statute, and I would submit it on 
that. 
THE COURT: Mr. Shumway, I don't have a lot of 
trouble in being able to say that the witnesses have talked 
about an appeal to prurient interest. I agree Mr. 
Hatzidakis was operating under a misapprehension of what 
the word meant, but what about this taken as a whole argument 
We've got part of a drawing on two, what appeared to me to 
be bedsheets. What about the taken as a whole argument? 
How do you respond to that? 
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MR. SHUMWAY: If your Honor please, the matter 
taken as a whole could be typified any of several ways. 
There's probably as much sexual content there as there is 
political. There's some — 
MR. BOYACK: If that's the case, they lose. 
THE COURT: If it's evenly balanced — 
MR. BOYACK: It isn't a balancing argument — 
I'm sorry, I didn't mean to interrupt. That's terribly 
discourteous. 
MR. SHUMWAY: If taken as a whole, it appeals 
to these things and fails to — 
THE COURT: You know, what Mr. Boyack said is 
an interesting thing. Is it a balancing test. Does 
taken as a whole mean you balance, because if you look 
at both of these bedsheets, what's the theme? There's 
no one theme that overrides anything else. 
MR. SHUMWAY: But I don't think it's a balancing 
test, your Honor. It doesn't say anywhere that the primary 
thing has to be sexual. It just says taken as a whole, 
it has that effect. I think that the thing taken as a whole 
can have several effects. If I were a rabid political 
zealot of a conservative persuasion, I suppose I could 
be affected by the thing as — as a political matter. But 
I think it also to the average person, and particularly 
a young person, I think it has definitely got a very strong 
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sexual theme. I see sexual innuendos in the form of 
symbols, and so on, slipped into things at different times 
and if there's enough of that, you soon reach a point where 
there's a sexual message, a sexual impact delivered by that 
total depiction, the whole thing. 
I don't think that I have to show that it's primarily 
sexual, but if it has a sexual message, portrays some 
sexuality that is obscene, that's sufficient. I don't think 
you could have a — there are cases that have some excerpts 
from writings or maybe an illustration taken in a whole 
context of a book, has some really value, and the courts have 
so held. But if you take this whole thing as a whole, there'^ 
not enough other stuff, literature or politics or whatever, 
to justify and give redeeming value to that portion that's 
offensive — obscene. 
And so just because you have some decent plot or 
some decent message somewhere, doesn't mean you can therefore 
have free license to interject as much filth and raunch 
as you want. The one does not give license to the other. 
If the sexual content were strictly secondary and 
not offensive when considered with the other, then there's 
some redeeming value in this thing. I don't find this 
taken as a whole has any redeeming value, even political, 
but I believe that's a jury question. I think Mr. Boyack's 
arguing facts that should be presented to the jury. 
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1 involved is not how the picture now impresses the individual 
2 juror, but rather considering the intended and probable 
3 recipients how the picture would have impressed the average 
4 person or member of a deviant sexual group. The worst 
5 picture that any of the State/Cityfs evidence was — is 
6
 a woman in the nude drawn with a paint can, and from that, 
7 counsel wants to infer that that, in and of itself, I guess 
B together with tuna factory and eat me and some of these 
9) other words, is the predominant thing of all of those 
statements that were made that the witness has agreed were 
either political or literary. And it just won't reach. Ther^ 
12
 I is not enough stride in Steve Garvey to touch first and 
13 I call this player out. It's strictly been three foul balls 
and three strikes, and I believe this Court has a duty not 
15
 to allow a case to go to a jury where they clearly haven't 
16
 met the burden as law in the case that they have to. 
17
 I And I'm very strong in requesting the Court to dismiss 
this case on the basis of failure to meet the corpus delicti 
of their own statute, which their own witnesses basically 
2 0
 I agree, factually hasn't been met. 
MR. SHUMWAY: If your Honor please, the language 
quoted by counsel is from the old Memoirs vs. Massachusettes 
test, which was later picked up by People vs. Roth. And that 
was overruled by Miller vs. California. You no longer show 
the dominant theme of the material as a whole appeals to 
prurient interest in sex. And now it's whether the average 
person applying contemporary community standards is 
defining that the word taken as a whole, appeals to 
prurient interest. And the Miller case is the one that 
now controls. They've taken out the "utterly without 
redeeming social value" part of the thing. There's various 
changes. Some a little subtle, some more specific. But 
the test that now applies, you don't have to prove anything 
about a dominent theme. It's just whether the work taken 
10
 1 as a whole appeals to the prurient interest. And I don't 
11
 I care what else is in there, if it appeals to the prurient 
12
 I interest, and that isn't just a macho man being aroused 
131 as the Court knows, then it's obscene. And this jury has 
141 a right to look at it, evaluate it, apply the community 
151 standard and make that determination. 
MR. BOYACK: I wasn't quoting from Miller or from 
Roth or from anything else. I was quoting from Section 277 
of the St. George statute. And — 
MR. SHUMWAY: No, the dominant theme thing that 
you read is just from — 
MR. BOYACK: Well, yeah. But I'm saying — 
THE COURT: You quoted your proposed Instruction 
23 1 
I No• 4, Mr. Boyack, and that's what Mr. Shumway is saying 
24 1 
1 has been replaced by Miller vs. California. 
25 1 
1
 MR. BOYACK: Well, I don't see anything in here 
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about redeeming social quality in here. We're talking 
about — and I don't think that any of this has been — 
MR. SHUMWAY: They've taken the redeeming out 
and now it says whether the word taken as a whole lacks 
serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value. 
The ordinance tracks Miller pretty — 
MR. BOYACK: I understand it does. But I'm just 
saying that in defining the ordinance, this is the test 
that's (inaudible) by their own ordinance. Their own 
ordinance says you've got to take it as a whole. It says 
that. Their own ordinance says it has to be without politica 
literary, artistic — we haven't put any evidence on of 
its artistic value, but we will, and what was the other, 
literary. 
THE COURT: Scientific is the one that you — 
MR. BOYACK: Scientific. That doesn't apply. 
But their own witnesses says, "Yeah, it could be literary," 
their own witnesses said, "Yeah, it could be political," 
and they're out by their statute not by Miller vs. United 
States or Roth or Pinkus or any of the alphabet soup 
that we have in the obscenity area of the law. I'm talking 
about purely under their own statute facts that we applied. 
THE COURT: The motion to dismiss is denied. 
And I'll tell you the reason why. The problem I see here 
is we've got a picture which is like a collage, a whole group] 
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of unrelated things that are — happen to be close to each 
other that are (inaudible) opposed next to one another. 
And I think if I granted the motion, it would be like 
saying people can put together political and artistic 
and have a little obscene part down here in the corner, 
but if the overriding thing is political, then the obscenity 
is protected, and I don't think that that's the intent of 
the ordinance, nor it is the intent of Miller vs. 
California. And since there appears to me to not be an 
overriding theme in these banners or these bedsheets, I 
think we can look at each part individually. 
And on that basis, the motion to dismiss is denied. 
Now, we're back to you, Mr. Boyack. The City says 
it's through with its evidence. Apparently one of your 
witnesses is here. Are you ready to start with — 
MR. BOYACK: I'm ready to proceed any time. 
THE COURT: Okay. I'd like to have us all just 
stay right here. We could get the jury brought back in 
so we don't have to take a break. Is that okay with 
everybody? 
MR. BOYACK: That's fine. 
THE COURT: For the purpose of the record, it's 
2:43. The jury's back in the jury box. The parties are 
present with counsel. The City has finished its case. Mr. 
Boyack, you're ready to go with your case, now? 
Ov.nw RAY CHHI»T!AN»tN. J*. 207 
